PERSONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM LICENSES AND THE
'SPECTER' OF BANKRUPTCY

Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker*

Over the past several years, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has auctioned strips of the electromagnetic
spectrum to companies interested in providing
wireless telephone personal communications services ("PCS"). This article focuses on the broadband PCS C-Block auction which was primarily
limited to small business "entrepreneur" entities.
'The auction was designed to encourage the development of, and foster competition among, small,
start-up wireless companies. In contrast to other
auctions of PCS spectrum, the C-Block auction included bidding incentives, such as the ability to
pay 90% of the debt on a low-interest installment
basis, reduced up-front and down payment requirements, and the use of bidding credits.
Pocket Communications ("Pocket"), the second
largest C-Block bidder, filed for bankruptcy in
March 1997.1 Prior to its filing, Pocket failed to

make the first of its installment payments and
upon filing, owed millions to the FCC. 2 Other CBlock bidders, including the fourth largest, National Telecom PCS ("NatTel"), have similarly defaulted over the course of the C-Block process, or
are currently on the verge thereof. Most recently,
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I Allan Sloan, The FCC Didn't Catch a Code, And Thereby
Hangs a Wireless Tale, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at C3.
2 Debra Wayne, FCC To Change C-Block Schedule: Pocket Admits Struggle To Keep Afloat, RADIO COMm. REP., Mar. 31, 1997,

at 1, 38 [hereinafter Radio Comm. Rep.].
3 Fourteen affiliates of General Wireless, Inc. filed for
bankruptcy on Oct. 20, 1997. General Wireless originally bid
about $1.1 billion for its PCS licenses and still owes more
than $953 million to the FCC. Second PCS 'C'Block BidderFiles
for Bankruptcy Protection, TELECOMMS. REP. INT'L., INC., Oct.
27, 1997; General Wireless Affiliates Seek Chapter 11 in Dallas,
THE DAiLY BA K'JR. REv., Oct. 28, 1997, at 2, 7; Statement by FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt on Bankruptcy Filing by PCS C-Block Licen-

in October 1997, affiliates of General Wireless,
Inc., another large C-Block bidder, followed
Pocket's lead and filed for bankruptcy. 3 These incidents have raised issues of first impression and
are of great concern because they threaten the integrity of the C-Block auction process, together
with its goal of helping small businesses, and also
threaten the federal government's collection of
approximately $10 billion in auction proceeds
which have already been included in the federal
budget. This article discusses the legal and practical issues that might arise in the context of a PCS
licensee's insolvency or bankruptcy filing, pursuant to which the FCC would be placed in the dual
and conflicting role of regulator and first priority
secured creditor.
BANKRUPTCY CONCEPTS
Bankruptcy courts have found licenses to be executory contracts. 4 Although FCC licenses appear
to have attributes of an executory contract, courts
neither apply nor discuss executory contract law
in dealing with the transfer of FCC licenses in
bankruptcy. 5 Instead, courts generally defer to
see General Wireless, FCC News, Oct. 27, 1997.
4
See, e.g., Krafsur v. UOP (In re El Paso Refinery, L.P.),
196 B.R. 58, 72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
5
An FCC license has the following attributes of an executory contract: (1) validity of the license is conditioned on the
licensee's performance of its obligations under the license
(including build-out requirements that are capital-consuming) and the related installment payment plan note and security agreement, as well as its compliance with the Communications Act of 1934, regulations and opinions of the FCC
and of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, (2) the absence of any ownership fights by the licensee in the subject
matter of the license, (3) the right of the FCC to cancel the
license in the event the licensee does not perform, and (4)
the requirement of FCC approval of any assignment of the
license. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 310(d) (1997); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.2110(e)(4) (1996); see also Form Broadband PCS C-Block
License [hereinafter License] (including, within its terms, all
of the above "executory" items); Form Installment Payment
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telecommunications law regarding restructure, or
assumption and assignment of FCC licenses in
bankruptcy and thus, have blessed such transactions, subject to FCC approval.6 For the most
part, these cases have involved radio broadcast
licenses. Transfer of a PCS license in bankruptcy,
however, is an issue of first impression. Therefore, it is unclear in the case of these financially
strapped C-Block licensees and, in view of the policy issues at stake, whether pertinent FCC rules
and policy statements will be strictly enforced.
Most courts agree that, once an FCC licensee
files for bankruptcy, its license becomes property
of the bankruptcy estate ("estate"). 7 Technically,
an FCC license must be transferred to the debtor
in possession ("DIP") or trustee and, outside of
bankruptcy, this transfer requires formal FCC approval." To expedite this transfer in bankruptcy,
however, it is accorded pro forma approval by the
FCC.

9

Once the license is in the hands of the DIP or
trustee, the latter will generally attempt to create
Plan Security Agreement for Broadband PCS C-Block Auction, paras. 2, 8, 11 [hereinafter Security Agreement] (incorporating all of the above items); Form Installment Payment
Plan Note for Broadband PCS C-Block Auction, at p. 3 [hereinafter Note] (providing that effectiveness of license is conditioned upon compliance with obligations under Note, License
and telecommunications law).
6- See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service v. Subranni (In re Atlantic Bus. and Community Dev. Corp.), 994 F.2d 1069, 1071
(3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Atlantic]; LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d
1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that the FCC abused its
discretion when it failed to consider recovery of creditors in
denying a license); In re Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139
B.R. 374, 375 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220,
221 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988); D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.,
Inc. v. Lake Erie Communications, Inc. (In reD.H. Overmyer
Telecasting Co., Inc.), 35 B.R. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983); In re WFDR, Inc., 10 B.R. 109, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981); In re Applications of Second Thursday Corp.
(WWGM), Nashville, Tenn., 25 F.C.C.2d 112, 115 (1970)
[hereinafter Second Thursday #2]; In re Applications of Second
Thursday Corp. (WWGM), Nashville, Tenn., 22 F.C.C.2d 515,
515-16 (1970) [hereinafter Second Thursday #1]; see also Shimer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 124 B.R. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), appeal dismissed, 982 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Fugazy #2] (describing that the Bankruptcy
Court directed the parties to obtain FCC approval of bankruptcy sale, but ultimately ignored the FCC's refusal to approve transfer based on the FCC's lack of participation in the
proceedings).
7
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1997); See Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1073;
Fugazy #2, 124 B.R. at 430; Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 376; Smith, 94
B.R. at 221; but see Overmyer, 35 B.R. at 401.
47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 24.839(a)
8
(1996); see Security Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2.
9 47 C.F.R. § 24.839(d)(5)(1996); LaRose, 494 F.2d at
1148; Smith, 94 B.R. at 221; Letter from William E. Kennard,
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funds for the estate by offering the license for
sale. If the licensee is in default, the FCC could
theoretically cancel and thus, presumably re-auction the license. 10 Such action would leave the
debtor and its creditors with no recourse to the
license, and possibly, with no recourse to any surplus proceeds of re-auction. 1 In contrast, in the
event of sale, surplus proceeds would likely be allocated to creditors.' 2 Although one court has
held that cancellation of a license or per se refusal
to approve its transfer constitutes a violation of
the automatic stay created in bankruptcy, another
court, in dictum, has expressed the opposite
view. 13 The tenuous authority of the FCC in this
area is highlighted by attempts, over the last year,
to draft legislation granting the FCC explicit authority to revoke and re-auction licenses of debtors in bankruptcy. 14 In addition, at a June 1997
FCC forum on the subject of C-Block repayment,
the Commission itself questioned its authority in
bankruptcy proceedings. 15
Not surprisingly, therefore, when faced with a
then General Counsel of the FCC, and Michele C. Farquhar,
then Chief of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to
Leonard J. Kennedy, Esq. and Richard S. Denning, Esq., 11
FCC Rcd. 21572, 21574 (1996) (discussing Note and Security
Agreement)
10 See
Agreement,
See
11

[hereinafter (-Block Letter].
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(e)(4)(iii)(1996); see Security
supra note 5, para. 8(a).
C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21576-77 (citing 47

U.S.C. § 309(0) (8) (1994)) (stating that all proceeds from the
use of competitive bidding shall be deposited in the Treasury
of the United States or used to cover certain of the Commission's costs); see also C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21578 n.4;
see Security Agreement, supra note 5, para. 8(d).
12
See C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21578 n.4; Security

Agreement, supra note 5, paras. 1-2 (granting third parties
subordinated security interest in proceeds of sale or disposition of license).
13

Compare Fugazy #2, 124 B.R. at 431 (stating that revoca-

tion of license by the FCC is not an act by governmental authority to protect health and safety of public that would qualify for exemption from automatic stay), with Overmyer, 35 B.R.
at 401 (ruling, without discussion, that stripping a broadcast
license, or refusing to allow the transfer or assignment of a
license qualify as actions by governmental authority which
are exempt from automatic stay); see 1I U.S.C. §§ 362(a),
(b) (4) (1994).
14

See Administration's Spectrum Revenue Proposal,

§ 1001 (a) (7) (F) (released week of June 9, 1997 by Office of
Management and Budget to be part of 1997 budget reconciliation package, available via Telecommunications Reports,

<http://www.tr.com/online/spectrum.htm>)

[hereinafter

Spectrum Revenue Proposal].
15
Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker, Notes from the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau Public Forum on "Broadband
PCS C and F Block Installment Payment Issues" (June 30,
1997) (on file with CoMMLAw CONSPECrus) [hereinafter

Notes from Public Forum].
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situation of financial distress, the FCC has consistently expressed a preference for "market-oriented
solutions" to the prospect of bankruptcy. 16 FCC
rules provide for work-outs between the FCC and
a PCS licensee through the grant of grace periods
and/or restructuring of payment plans. Since the
inception of the C-Block process, the FCC has
stated its willingness to grant a three to six month
grace period for defaulting PCS licensees, during
which time the licensee could maintain its construction efforts and/or operations while seeking
funds to continue payments or seek from the FCC
a restructured payment plan. 17 The FCC has
stated that it will evaluate requests for a grace period on a case-by-case basis, and consider factors
such as the licensee's payment history, including
whether it has defaulted previously, how far into
the license term the default occurs, the reasons
for default, whether the licensee has met construction build-out requirements, the licensee's financial condition, and whether the licensee is
seeking a buyer pursuant to a distress sale.' The
FCC has further indicated that, when a licensee is
in bankruptcy, foreclosure or financial distress, a
presumption will exist in favor of granting a three
month grace period, commencing ninety days after the missed payment date, for a total of six
months.19 In addition, the FCC encourages workout arrangements between the licensee and its
outside lenders, stating that it would become in20
volved only in transfer situations.
The availability of these out-of-court work-out
opportunities presumes that, within a three to six
month period, a PCS licensee would be able to
16

In re Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules-

Competitive Bidding Proceeding, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 362,
369 (1997) [hereinafter 97 Amendment] (citing In re Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules - Broadband PCS Competitive Bidding and the Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Spectrum Cap, Amendment of the Commission's Cellular/PCS Cross-Ownership Rule, Report and Order,
11 FCC Rcd. 7824, para. 85, at 7864 (1996)); C-Block Letter,
supra note 9, at 21573-74 (citing In. re Implementation of Section 309(I) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 403
(1994)).
17 C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21573-75 (citing In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8
FCC Rcd. 7700 (1993) and Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 16, at 471).
18 See id.
19 Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Staff Responds

to Questions About the Broadband PCS C-Block Auction, 78
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 727, 729-30 (1995); see 47 C.F.R.

procure financial backing sufficient to get itself
back on its feet. This has not turned out to be
feasible for the C-Block licensees. Therefore, a
more flexible solution will be required if the
FCC's goal is to achieve a restructuring of C-Block
debt. An alternative to restructuring would be the
sale of such debt. Although the FCC has always
been amenable to this work-out alternative, it has
consistently indicated that any such sale would be
conditioned on complete fulfillment of license
conditions. 2 1 This is likely to prove problematic
for C-Block licensees. Accordingly, in the absence
of a palatable restructuring proposal, these licensees are likely to opt for bankruptcy in the hope
that FCC transfer requirements will not be strictly
enforced by a bankruptcy court.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
In evaluating whether to approve a license
transfer, the FCC must determine whether the licensee's conduct, during the period in which it
held the license, qualifies it for renewal of the license. In bankruptcy proceedings involving radio
broadcast cases, the FCC has foregone this inquiry
where benefits to creditors significantly outweigh
benefits to a wrongdoer licensee. 2 2 This is known
as the "Second Thursday" doctrine. 23 In addition,
the FCC is required to consider the needs of public end-users. 24 Nevertheless, the FCC is reluctant
to approve transfers to licensees who are guilty of
misconduct, leading to delays in approval of bank25
ruptcy sales.

Upon renewal, a PCS license may be sold in
§§ 1.2110(e)(4)(ii), (iii) (1996).
20
97 Amendment, supra note 16 (citing C-Block Letter, supra
note 9, at 21573).
21
Id. at 369; see C-Block Letter, supra note 9.
22
LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1147-48, followed by Shimer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 114 B.R. 865, 873-74
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at
114-15; Second Thursday #1, 22 F.C.C.2d at 518; accord Two If
By Sea Broadcasting Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. 2254 (1997) [hereinafter Two If By Sea].
23 See LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1146; see generally Second Thursday #1, 22 F.C.C.2d at 520 (explaining that a bankrupt wrongdoer licensee may effectuate a sale for the benefit of innocent creditors if this action will serve the public interest).
24
C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21574-75 (citing Fifth
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 16, at 471); see LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1146; Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115;
In re Twelve Seventy, Inc., I F.C.C.2d 965, 969 (1965) (Cox,

dissenting commissioner) [hereinafter Twelve Seventy]; 97
Amendment, supra note 16.
25

See Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115-16 (approv-
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bankruptcy, subject to compliance with certain restrictions. In brief, these restrictions mandate
that a transfer be made to a qualified transferee
who assumes the payment obligations of the transferor. 26 In bankruptcy, such rules may be waived
by the FCC; however, full payment is nonetheless
required. 27 These provisions are designed to prevent "unjust enrichment" of the licensee, and in
the C-Block context, require that principal and accrued interest be paid to the Commission at the
time of transfer.2 8 Similar provisions require adjustments for any loss of eligibility to use bidding
credits. 29 Interestingly, because FCC rules require
that a PCS license transfer be accompanied by full
payment, sale of a PCS license in bankruptcy is
treated much like assumption and assignment of
an executory contact. Failure to restructure or assign a PCS license, however, would not be analogous to rejection of an executory contract. Instead, the result, at least outside of bankruptcy,
would be cancellation and re-auction.
The FCC's full payment requirements appear to
be in conflict with the bankruptcy policy favoring
restructuring of debt and equitable distribution
among creditors.3 0 While generally approving
FCC license sales in bankruptcy, courts are silent
on the issue of full repayment. 3 1 This is because
bankruptcy case law typically deals with the normal business failure of a radio station and focuses
on the role and value of the license as part of an
on-going concern. In contrast, the major issue in
the PCS C-Block context is the licensee's inability
to fulfill its financial obligations to the FCC.

Although the case law is helpful in assessing how a
court might treat an FCC license transfer in bankruptcy, it does not resolve the issues that may arise
in the typical PCS C-Block case. Again, attempts
to draft legislation strictly enforcing the FCC's full
payment obligations in bankruptcy demonstrate
the Commission's fear that they would not other-

ing sale upon petition for reconsideration, on grounds that
second proposal provided for better recovery to creditors
than first proposal); LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1149-50 (refusing to
approve sale which provided for 97.51% recovery to creditors, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
FCC's decision); see also Twelve Seventy, I F.C.C.2d at 967 (citing court's refusal to consider sale proposal without renewal
hearing, stating that creditors take risk that bankruptcy
might occur).
26 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2111(c), 24.839(d) (1996).
27
See id. at §§ 1.2111(c), 24.711(c), 24.839(a) (1996); 97
Amendment, supra note 16, at 369-70.
28 47 C.F.R. § 24.711 (c); see 97 Amendment, supra note 16,
at 378.
29 47 C.F.R. § 24.712(b) (2); see 97 Amendment, supra note
16, at 378. In addition, the Note and Security Agreement require
the payment of collection costs by a defaulting licensee regardless of bankruptcy. Security Agreement, supra note 5, para.
8(e); see Note, supra note 5.
30 See C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21574-75 (citing Fifth
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 16, at 471).
31
See, e.g., Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1070; Fugazy #2, 124 B.R.

at 431; Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 375; Smith, 94 B.R. at 221; Second
Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115; see generally LaRose, 494 F.2d
1145 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See Spectrum Revenue Proposal,supra note 14.
32
33
See Notes from PublicForum, supra note 15.
34
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g)(2), 1.2109(b),
24.704(a) (2), 24.708(b), 24.711(a) (2) (1996); 97 Amendment,
supra note 16, at 382-83; see generally In re BDPCS, Inc., Emergency Petitionfor Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules, 12 FCC Rcd. 3230 (1997); In re Nat'l Telecom
PCS, Inc., Request for Waiver of Bid Withdrawal Payment and Applicationfor Authority to Construct a PersonalCommunicationsSystem on Frequency Block C in American Samoa, Market No. B492,
12 FCC Rcd. 10163 (1997); In re C.H. PCS, Inc., Request for
Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules, 11 FCC
Rcd. 9343 (1996); Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Will
Strictly Enforce Default Payment Rules, 11 FCC Rcd. 10853
(1996).
35 See In re Longstreet Communications Int'l, Inc., Request
for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules Regarding Market No. B012, 12 FCC Rcd. 1549, para. 8, at 155152 (1997) [hereinafter Longstreet].

wise be enforced by a bankruptcy court. 32 These

fears of the "unknowns of the bankruptcy process"
were also a subject of discussion at last year's C33
Block repayment forum.
CURRENT ISSUES
In light of these unknowns, and in order to salvage the C-Block process, the FCC has begun to
relax its repayment rules, enforcing strictly only
those requirements pertaining to the first half of
the 10% down payment required of C-Block installment payers. Where this initial payment has
not been timely made, the FCC has canceled and
re-auctioned the license (as well as assessed default penalty payments). 3 4 The FCC has been less

strict concerning both the second part of the
down payment and subsequently owed installment payments. With respect to the second down
payment, the FCC has been flexible with respect
to minor delinquencies which neither affect the
timing of the auction, nor the FCC's review of the
applicant's qualifications. 35 For example, where

the delay in payment has been short (ranging
from one day to two weeks), and resulted from
administrative error, the FCC has waived its right
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to cancel the license, charging a late fee instead. 36
With respect to installment payments, the FCC
has frozen the pertinent deadlines, coincidentally
doing so on the very day that Pocket filed for
bankruptcy.37 At stake is nearly half of the $23 billion raised since 1994 when the PCS auctions began. The freeze was ordered pursuant to a formal
request by certain licensees that the payment
schedule be changed from quarterly to annual to
38
facilitate their access to capital.
The FCC's most recent and controversial endeavor in trying to keep the C-Block licensees out
of bankruptcy is its adoption last September of a
set of alternative solutions designed to strike a balance among the licensees' varying needs, and still
preserve the integrity of the auction process.
These alternatives range from strict enforcement
of FCC full payment rules to opportunities for
buy-out and/or return of the licenses in exchange
for a certain amount of debt forgiveness and attendant penalties. 39 Criticism has already been
voiced by interested parties, including some of
36
In re RFW, Inc., Request for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2)
of the Commission's Rules Regarding Market No. B230, 12 FCC
Rcd. 1536, paras. 7-8, at 1538 (1997); Longstreet, supra note
35; In re MFRI, Inc., Request for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2) of
the Commission's Rules RegardingMarket No. B435, 12 FCC Rcd.
1540, para. 8, at 1542 (1997); In, re Roberts-Roberts & Assoc.,
LLC, Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules Regarding Various BTA Markets, 12 FCC Rcd. 1825,
paras. 7-8, at 1827-28 (1997); In re Wireless Telecomm. Co.,
Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's
Rules RegardingMarket No. B411, 12 FCC Rcd. 1544, para. 7, at
1546-47 (1997); In re Southern Communications Sys., Inc.,
Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711 (a)(2) of the Commission's
Rules RegardingMarket No. B085, 12 FCC Rcd. 1532, paras. 7-8,
at 1534 (1997).
37
See In re Installment Payments for PCS Licensees, DA 97649 (1997).
38
See id.
39
See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, Second Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 97-82 (Sept.
25, 1997); FCC Adopts Menu of Options for Modifying C-Block
Payments; Seeks Comment on Implementation of Options (Rpt. No.
WT 97-37) (WTDkt. No. 97-82), FCC News, Sept. 13, 1990.
The FCC order reinstates the deadline for making installment payments to Mar. 31, 1998 (one year from the date of
the freeze) with the licensee being required to choose one of
the following four alternative options byJan. 15, 1998:
Option 1: Existing Note Obligations. Licensees may elect to continue making payments under their original installment payment plan notes in accordance with the terms of those notes
and the Commission's rules.
Option 2: Disaggregation. A licensee may elect to disaggregate
one-half of its spectrum and return such spectrum to the
FCC for re-auction. The licensee must disaggregate spectrum for all of the Basic Trading Area ("BTA") licenses it

the Commissioners

themselves. 4°1

In fact, the

General Wireless bankruptcy filings exemplify the
dissatisfaction of the licensees with these restructuring options. At publication, the FCC was seeking comment on the re-auction process that is
contemplated by these options.
The repayment issues have been further complicated by antitrust concerns raised by various
bidders through complaints and/or petitions
filed with the FCC and in court, accusing rival
companies of collusive actions to corner certain
PCS markets. 41 Some bidders are accused of using bidding signals to drive up the price for
licenses sought by rival bidders. Yet another form
of collusion has been alleged in a suit brought
against Pocket in a New York federal district court
just prior to its bankruptcy filing. 42 In that suit,

brought by NatTel against Pocket and others, the
defendants are accused of diverting to themselves
investment funds allegedly "earmarked for the
plaintiffs." 43 NatTel is seeking damages of at least

owns within any Major Trading Area ("MTA"). In exchange,
the licensee will have the proportionate half of its debt forgiven. One half of the downpayment will be applied toward
the debt for the retained spectrum, while the other half will
be forfeited. The licensee will be prohibited from rebidding
for the returned spectrum or otherwise acquiring it in the
secondary market for two years from the date of re-auction.
Option 3: Amnesty. A licensee may return all of its licenses, in
exchange for which all of the licensee's outstanding debt will
be forgiven. Its downpayment will be forfeited. It will be permitted to bid on its returned licenses at re-auction, and there
is no restriction on after-market acquisitions. An exception
to the all-or-nothing requirement would be made as to licensees that have met or exceeded the five year build-out requirements by Sept. 25, 1997. These licensees may retain
their built-out BTAs, but must also keep the other BTAs in
the MTA where the build-out requirement has been met.
Option 4: Prepayment. A licensee may purchase any of its
licenses at the face value originally bid by the licensee. The
licensee must purchase all the BTA licenses it owns within
any single MTA. The licensee may use 70% of its downpayment and any additional monies that it is able to raise to buy
out its licenses; the remaining 30% of the deposit and any
unused portion of the 70% will be forfeited. Licenses that
are not prepaid must be returned for re-auction, in exchange
for which the corresponding debt will be forgiven. The licensee may not rebid for the returned licenses or acquire them
in the secondary market for a period of two years from the
date of re-auction. See id.
40
See id.; Stephanie N. Mehta and John R. Wilke, FCC
Plan to Aid Wireless Carriers Is Tougher Than Firms Hoped For,
WALL ST. J.,

Sept. 26, 1997, at B5.

41

See Radio Comm. Rep., supra note 2.

42

See id.

See id. The defendants were cited for "violation of the
Sherman Act, breach of contract, tortious interference with
contractual relations and fraud." Id.
43
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$1 billion. 44
SECURITY INTEREST
Telecommunications law and policy does not
permit the grant of a direct security interest in an
FCC license to a third party because such a grant
might endanger the independence of the licensee, as well as interfere with the FCC's plenary
power to protect the public interest in the airwaves. 45 The FCC permits the grant of a security
interest in proceeds of an FCC authorized transfer, but it is generally subordinated to the FCC's
46
first priority interest.
Additional security can be obtained by taking a
security interest in the assets of the licensee's business and/or obtaining a pledge of its stock. 4 7 Because the respective values of a license and related
business assets tend to be maximized upon sale of
the going concern, all of the above forms of security, taken together, would bring the lender as
close as possible to having a security interest in

the license itself. The value of the security would
be further enhanced by the "bare license" policy
of the FCC, pursuant to which the FCC will generally not approve the sale of a license without an
accompanying transfer of the related facility's
physical assets. 48 Conversely, if the assets are
somehow lost, taken over, or become inoperable,
cancellation of the license could result. More44

See id.

See Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1074 (citing Smith, 94 B.R. at
221 (quoting In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829-30 (1983))); 97
Amendment, supra note 16, at 368-69; C-Block Letter, supra note
9, at 21572-73.
45

46 97 Amendment, supra note 16 (citing C-Block Letter, supra
note 9, at 21572); see Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1074-75 (citing
Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 378-79); Security Agreement, supra note 5,
paras. 1-2.
47 See Howard M. Liberman & Gerald Stevens-Kittner,
Lending to Broadcast Stations-Part 1, LOAN OFFICER'S LEGAL
ALERT, 5, 6 (1989); Jack Whitley, A Printer on Commercial
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over, the security interest in the sale proceeds will
not survive if the license is canceled. 49 Accordingly, although the FCC encourages the financing
of PCS licenses by outside lenders, the FCC, acting in the role of both regulator and first priority
secured creditor, ultimately controls the rights
and remedies of all other creditors. These rights
and remedies could range from collection of the
full debt amount from the proceeds of a distress
sale to loss of all rights in the collateral through
cancellation of the license.
CONCLUSION
How the FCC will handle these issues is the
principal question facing players in the wireless
industry. The FCC seems concerned about the
specter of bankruptcy filings by its C-Block licensees, despite both the historic deference accorded
telecommunications law in bankruptcy proceedings and the fact that the FCC would enjoy the
position of first priority secured creditor.
In attempting to keep its licensees out of bankruptcy, the FCC is encouraging distressed bidders
to restructure under the September 1997 proposal - and to do so quickly. As the FCC now appears to recognize, a near-term resolution of this
issue is necessary to attract capital and forestall
the C-Block's loss of market share to larger wireless companies.
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